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RESTRICTED 
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
A lecture delivered by 
Rear Admiral George W. Baurenschmidt, U.S.N. 
at the Naval War Colle� 
February 16, 1950 
In the last war production as a problem was solved very 
early, but the problem of distribution was not solved. Transporta­
tion is a major component of distribution. Traffic management 
is a major component of transportation. My subject today is 
"Traffic Management." But it cannot be discussed without a dis­
cussion first of transportation as it pertains to logistics. 
We are. accustomed to thinking of war in terms of fighting, 
but you here at the Logistics Course of the War College must by 
now recognize that the major part of modern war is logistics, and 
transportation is a big part of logistics. The statistics of trans­
portation in the Second World War are impressive and colossal. 
Cargo and passenger ships outnumbered fighting ships many 
times over. The Army, which depended almost entirely on truck 
transportation in the European theater, had 30,000 men just op­
erating railroads in that theater. The tonnage hauled away from 
the United States for the war effort can be represented as half a 
thousand billion ton miles, while inside the United States the 
railroads alone in one year hauled three quarters of a thousand 
billion ton miles. The Navy each day during the war turned over to 
carriers in the United States an average of 100,000 tons of material. 
These statistics are not only colossal, they are beyond comprehen­
sion just as is the National debt, which, in no small part, represents 
transportation costs. I cannot stress too much the point that in 
modern war, transportation is a factor to be given ever greater 
Admiral Baurenschmidt is Deputy Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. 
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consideration for its importance; cost, and.effect grow 'and grow. as 
new techniques of war develop. The soldier of Caesar's Legions 
furnished his own transportation and lived off the land, but in the 
intervening 2000 years since the days of t,hese Legions, such things . 
as gun powder, petroleum, feeding habits and spare parts have 
made transportation a matter of grave concern· to the military 
leader. 
Transportation is a chain of many links including the actual 
media of movement such as trucks, trains, planes and ships, and 
including terminals, ports, landing fields and storage facilities. In 
time of war, or any other time of maximum utilization of trans­
portation, all links of this chain must be of equal strength. Thus 
the capacity of railroad cars serving a port must be matched by 
port capacity, ship capacity, and finally capacity at the terminal 
at the other end of the overseas haul. A bottleneck anywhere re­
duces the efficiency of the whole. The result of imbalance was con­
spicuous in the First World War when there w�s an actual back­
ing up of 200,000 loaded freight cars at New York because of in­
sufficient port facilities and vessels capacity. To give you some 
idea as to what 200,000 freight cars constitute in the way of a 
block to traffic, they jam the facilities of the railroads from New 
York all· the way back to Pittsburgh. Proper balance between 
the links of transportation can be maintained in some pa� by the 
carrier operators, but by far the greater agent in maintaining this 
balance is good traffic management. 
The Second World War shows that much has been learned 
from the lessons of the first great war. There were no serious 
breakdowns in transportation even though imbalances did exist, 
and to show you that imbalance did· exist and in part to indicate 
how they weretaken care of, I can state that Navy material await­
ing transportation across the Pacific was backed . up for want of 
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shipping, backed up as far as Illinois, but the effect of this back­
up on transportation was kept to a minimum by the expedient of 
retaining the material in warehouses. In other words whenever 
it became apparent that the material could not be moved forward 
beyond a certain point, it was placed in warehouses until it could 
move forward and so the Navy operated warehouses from San 
Francisco to Illinois. 
Just as there were lessons to be learned from the First 
World War so are there lessons to be learned from the Second. 
Two of these are : first, there is a need for more intelligent use of 
port facilities, and second, there is a need for the use of more 
ports with less emphasis on the large ports. Under the National 
Security Resources Board there is an agency studying the Na­
tion's needs for transportation in the next war and the means to 
best satisfy those needs. This agency, come the next war, will 
probably be the successor to the Office of Defense Transportation, 
which operated in the last war. The name of this agency is Of­
fice of Transportation and Storage. It is planning port-utilization 
now and has established rules and an organization, which should do 
much to promote maximum port utilization. In the last war we 
shipped most of our cargo through the East Coast ports of New 
York, Norfolk, Boston and Philadelphia, and through the West 
Coast ports of San Francisco, San Pedro, Seattle, and Port 
Hueneme. The disadvantages of this type of operation are self­
apparent. First, such concentration of war material and transporta­
tion facilities offers excellent targets in the age of atomic warfare. 
It also narrows the hunting fields of the wolf packs of submarines. 
Just as important as the first two is the fact that this restrictive 
use of the Nation's port facilities overtaxes the ones that are used, 
the railroads that serve them, while leaving comparatively idle 
many smaller ports and the railroads serving them. It is the 
Navy's intention, and I have been assured that it is the intention 
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In other words, it is not merely sufficient that he balance the charges 
of one carrier against those of another but he must also include such 
items as the cost of packaging required for each mode of travel, 
and such items as stevedoring. When using premium transporta­
tion to achieve speed, he must not only weigh need against cost, 
but he must provide for, or insure that, his package is transferred 
to a more reliable but slower means of conveyance whenever the 
premium type carrier is unable to perform. 
The matter of cost of transportation is not the simple one 
of inquiring of each carrier what he will charge to haul a specific 
load of freight. The tariff structure is complicated and a rather 
wide field for negotiation even though rates have been published. 
The Armed Services have been subjected to a fair amount of criti­
cism because they failed to negotiate in transit rates for tre­
mendous amounts of material moved during the recent war. I can 
describe an in transit rate somewhat in this fashion. Short hauls 
cost more per mile than do long ones, but when material is des­
tined to make a long haul, which is interrupted, the carrier may 
legally charge the short haul rate, but the user may demand and 
get the long haul rate. 
Suppose, for example, Mechanicsburg is shipping engine 
parts to San Francisco, but these parts should be added to other 
parts at Clearfield to form full kits. If the Navy claims in transit 
privileges it may ship the parts to Clearfield where Clearfield 
works on them for several weeks and then sends them on in kits to 
San Francisco. The Navy may claim through rates for the parts 
from Mechanicsburg to Clearfield and for that portion of the ship­
ment from Clearfield to San Francisco which represents the origi­
nal parts. Involved also in the matter of rates is the commodity 
classification. Rates have been established for each commodity. It 
is incumbent upon the shipper to designate his shipment as falling in 
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that commodity group which is both appropriate and carrying 
the minimum rate. To illustrate this point, I cite the case of the 
man who went to the cereal manufacturer and stated that he could 
save him large sums of money. The manufacturer was skeptical 
but finally entered into a contract which proved to be lucrative to 
both the manufacturer and the man. The man's proposal was 
that the manufacturer stop calling his product the shredded wheat 
biscuits and merely call it shredded wheat, because under the first 
.name the product took the tariff for bakery products since it was 
called a biscuit, while under the second name it took the much lower 
tariff for cereals. The services have been criticized for failing to 
take advantage during the recent war of in transit privileges and 
proper commodity classification. It is true that leisurely analysis 
after the war can show that a billion dollars could have been saved 
by better traffic management but so can every Monday-morning 
quarterback prove to you how last Saturday's game could have been 
better played. 
Traffic management has been defined many times. I shall 
give you a definition which may be over-simplified, but which focuses 
attention upon its salient features. Traffic management is the 
science of procuring for the shipper the cheapest possible transporta­
tion consistent with delivery requirements in times of· peace, and, 
especially in time of war, securing the greatest and most effective 
utilization of carrier capacity. 
This appears to be the age of centralization in government, 
and that in spite of the fact that almost a generation ago big busi­
ness found that over-centralization was costly, and big business 
has long since decentralized in many areas. We·are urged today to 
centralize under one head all transportation controls in the Navy. 
Then to centralize under one head all transportation controls for the 
Army, Navy and the Air Force. And finally, we. are .told to central-
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ize under one head all transportation controls for the Department 
of Defense and for all other Government departments. And yet 
during the recent war both the Army and Navy found it necessary 
to decentralize their transportation controls to agencies in the field. 
Some concentration is indicated. How much there will be remains 
to be seen. As of the moment there has been formed a Central 
Military Land Traffic Office to perform under the administration 
of the Army certain functions which the Army, Navy and Air 
Force were mutually agreed could be centrally performed and yet 
leave to each of the three departments those functions of traffic 
management which each of the three services at present believe 
essential to its own adequate operation. Some of these functions 
are: (a) Negotiation of rates and charges on after-the-fact ship­
ments, (b) Issuance of freight classification guides, (c) Negotia­
tion of rates and average demurrage agreements, (d) Issuance of 
export release permits under conditions of war or emergency only, 
(e) Exchange of information as to availability of service-owned
equipment to promote maximum use, (f) Operation of freight
consolidating and distributing stations if and when established by
mutual agreement in times of war or emergency. To the functions
assigned to the Central Military Land Traffic Office can be added
other functions when the three departments are satisfied that it
is appropriate to lodge them there. Should the departments feel
that any of the present functions are improperly lodged in that
Office, they may be removed and restored to the several depart­
ments. So far the operation of this central office appears to be
satisfying all three services. Further, it is hoped that by the im­
provement in their operations the three departments may satisfy
the General Services Administration and other agencies of the Gov­
ernment that it will be unnecessary to centralize any traffic manage­
ment of the three military departments in any other agency of the
government. The three military departments are already of the
opinion that it would be unwise so to do.
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Just as there are some in the government who are clamor­
ing for centralization and more centralization, so are there those 
who within the Department of Defense advocate that transportation 
be divided between its three major media and assigned to the three 
departments. Under this concept the Department of the Army 
would budget for and operate all land transportation, while the De­
partment of the Navy would budget for and operate all sea trans­
portation, and the Department of the Air Force would perform sim­
ilar functions for all air transportation. This theory, like many 
another theory before it, sounds very attractive and plausible. 
Those who advocate it persuade many, but never do they persuade 
one who has a sound comprehension of traffic management. There 
are many sound arguments against this compartmentation or frag­
mentation of traffic management. I can illustrate the general tenor 
of most of them by stating that it is essential that one brain or 
group of brains direct the routing of a single shipment from its 
point or origin to its final destination. Let us assume that traffic 
management has been fragmented into its three components. Let 
us consider a single shipment that involves only land and sea trans­
port. And let us suppose that this shipment originates in Ohio and 
is destined for Tokyo. First it falls into the hands of the land 
transportation traffic manager. He is interested in getting this 
shipment to tide water and off his hands in the minimum time and 
at the minimum cost. He, therefore, routes it from Ohio to Hamp­
ton Roads. This does not suit the sea transport people for it in­
volves the long haul from Hampton Roads through the Canal and 
out to Tokyo. The sea transport people would much prefer that 
the shipment be consigned to San Francisco where they can pick it 
up and carry it to T'okyo for the cheapest rates and in the shortest 
time. If, however, a single brain is planning the movement from 
its point of origin to its destination, this brain might well balance 
all time and all costs and arrive at the solution that the cheapest 
over-all routing within the allowed time would be to ship by rail 
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from Ohio to New Orleans, and by sea from New Orleans through 
the Canal to Tokyo. There are similar arguments predicated upon 
the use of premium transportation and others upon the budgetary 
problems involved. The operation of sea transport has been as:. 
signed to the Navy, and the operation of MATS has been assigned 
to the Air Force. · Regretably there are no major land carriers 
which are owned by the Department of Defense and the operation 
of which could be assigned to the Army. It, therefore, looks as 
though the Army has been short changed. Unless I have missed 
some important point the probability is that within a very few 
years the Army will find that it has gained rather than lost in this 
assignment for it looks very much as though the Navy will ulti­
mately be required to assume budgetary responsibility for MSTS 
and the Air Force a similar responsibility for MATS leaving the 
Army unburdened with any similar responsibility since all three 
services are required to budget for their land transportation. Those 
who advocate fragmentation of transportation do so because they 
mistake carrier operation for traffic management. It is the first 
which has been assigned and not the second and there is no direct 
relationship between the two. Unfortunately it is not only those 
who cannot differentiate between carrier operation and traffic man­
agement who are advocating this fragmentation. There is also a 
group of people who would expand their own empire. I point the 
finger at no one department. All three have their empire builders 
in the fields of transportation. 
It is perfectly true that in assigning carrier operations to 
the Navy and to the Air Force certain traffic management functions 
have gone to those two services incident to this assignment. These 
traffic management functions are essentially those of routing once 
the cargo has been made available to the carrier. In the case of 
MATS this is of little significance in view of the fact that the 
charter of private planes has been reassigned by MATS to the 
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three departments, MATS only retaining clearance to be sure that 
chartered planes are used to maximum capacity. In the case of 
MSTS the three departments, as shippers, have the right to lay 
down their cargo at any port they choose. From there on it be­
comes the responsibility of MSTS to deliver the cargo to its over­
seas destination and in the time specified. MSTS has the choice of 
using ships of its own or of using commercial bottoms. Those who 
advocate this system say that, in effect, MSTS has embraced all 
ocean carriers and, in effect, there is only one carrier. Hence, 
routing is a matter of little, if any, concern to the shipper. I, for 
one, do not agree with this and am actively advocating that the 
three departments each pay for their cargo which is shipped in 
commercial bottoms at tariff rates and that they retain the right 
to specify that their cargo shall go by such shipments and on such 
ships as they select with MSTS merely negotiating the contract 
for the lift. If this is done, each service will have retained all that 
is essential in traffic management. 
Incident to the effect of unification on military transporta­
tion the question of priorities in traffic management has received 
considerable notice and to date there is no generally agreed upon 
policy with regard to priorities. Since priorities in many instances 
determine the sequence of shipment and in other cases result in 
premium transportation, it is obvious that there is need for an ac­
cepted policy with regard to them. One school of thought advo­
cates priorities predicated upon categories of material. Under this 
concept, for example, bullets might always precede beans, and 
beans always precede general stores. It may be perfectly true that 
under normal conditions, ammunition is more important than food, 
and food is more important than general stores, but this is not al­
ways so and we come to the belief of the second group who main­
tain that priorities are predicated upon need and not upon cate­
gories. Why should ammunition, they say, always come first when 
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you may have plenty of ammunition and not enough food? Or why 
should ammunition and food both come ahead of general stores 
when you may have plenty of ammunition and food and be in dire 
need of general stores? So they say that priorities are predicated 
Upon need and further that only the shipper, or the owner and user 
of the material, can determine need. This issue I hope to see 
settled in the very near future and settled by the establishment of 
the policy that need determine priority. 
No discussion of traffic management would be complete 
without consideration of the newest medium of transportation, 
namely, air lift, and on no subject in the field of transportation is 
their wider divergence of opinion, than there is on the matter of 
air lift. First, we have those who advocate it because they believe 
in anything pertaining to air, and those who oppose it because they 
have never been satisfied that the airplane is here to stay. There 
are those who distort the incomplete statistics of air lift during the 
war to prove any point of view they may happen to take, but air lift 
is here and it is here to stay. The question to be answered is, to 
what extent can it be relied upon and how can it best be used. The 
statistics of the last war are really of little help. First, few sta­
tistics w�re collected because people were more interested in getting· 
the job done than in recording what it took to get it done. Next, 
air lift just grew and it grew in an unplanned but surprisingly rapid 
fashion. And, third, there were many flagrant misuses of air lift, 
some through lack of understanding of its potentiality and of its 
cost and some through downright selfishness. There are many of 
us who operated in overseas supply fields during the war who re­
member. being denied air lift for vitally needed supplies only to 
find that the next incoming plane was loaded with a mahogany bar 
and slot machines for some air :field being established, or with 
wolf bait for some VIPs in the big cities of the ETO. Be that as 
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it may, the recent war convinced us that air lift was a factor in 
modern logistics. 
As of the present our approach to air lift is not too intelli­
gent and our thinking on that score can be illustrated by the con­
clusions reached by a certain clergyman who found himself con­
fronted by a couple desiring to be united in matrimony. Their ap­
pearance led him to inquire of the groom his age, and when the 
response came forth, "75," the clergyman asked "and why, sir, do 
you desire to be married?" The prospective groom said "Because 
I want an heir." The clergyman then turned to the prospective 
bride and asked her age. When told that she was 68, he asked her 
why she wanted to be married, and she said that she too wanted 
an heir. This led the clergyman to come to the conclusion that 
the couple were "heir-minded," but not "heir-conditioned." And 
so it is with our thinking. We are air minded but not air conditioned. 
We ship by air in part as an attempt to make up for mistakes in 
planning. We ship by air because we know that air travel is fast. 
We have yet to analyze our air lift and find out to what degree it 
is dependable, when air cargo is grounded how rapidly can we move 
the cargo to other means of travel, what is the true cost of air lift, 
what actual saving in time can be counted upon and what categories 
of material are best suited for air lift? When we have the answers 
to these questions and we apply them properly, air lift will be on a 
much firmer and more satisfactory footing. 
The true cost of our military air lift today is staggering. 
The reliability is very low. The average time saved is very little, 
but if we take the time to do some research, we will find our present 
cost of military air lift well worth while, and when I speak of re­
search I am speaking of research in the actual operation of a 
carrier service and in the actual traffic management which accom­
panies it. I am not one of those who believe that in the next war 
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we can dispense with supply depots and we can dispense with ships, 
all because everything will be brought by air immediately from the 
factory to the consumer's hands. I am one of those who believe 
that · substantial quantities of high priority cargo will and must 
be transported by air, and to do this satisfactorily we must have 
uniform documentation, we must have a route pattern to serve the 
customer's needs, operational performance must be measured in 
· terms of customer satisfaction not in terms of pilot satisfaction.
Parenthetically I define pilot satisfaction as on;..time departures plus
flight safety plus a high degree of aircraft utilization and similar
factors. And, :finally, we must have some rules qf thumb by which
we can readily determine when the expenditure of fuel and the use
of expensive equipment involved in air lift are warranted. In other
words we must know when we should ship by air and when we
should not ship by air. We need cargo aircraft designed for spec­
ific ranges and specific loading and discharge conditions. In short
what I have said about air lift is that it is an infant, a lusty in­
fant it is true, but nevertheless an inf ant.
Many of the schemes to achieve economy, which have been 
presented to the Department of Defense in the name of unification, 
would be perfectly sound if the Department of Defense were a busi­
ness, the objective of which was to show� profit. But when they de­
crease.the effectiveness of the Department of Defense as a military 
organization, they are without merit and definitely detrimental. The 
flaw in many of the schemes pertaining to logistics lies in the fact 
that all areas of logistics must be responsive and responsible to the 
tactical and strategical commanders, and these schemes do not recog­
nize this fact. Transportation, being one of the components of logis­
tics, must be also responsive and responsible to command. This is true 
in peace of traffic management and in war it is true of both carrier­
operations and traffic management. It is for this reason that I stated 
earlier that the three military departments are already of the opin­
ion that it would be unwise to centralize the traffic management of 
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the three military departments in any other agency of the Govern .. 
ment. This is also the reason why each of the three military de­
partments in establishing the Central Military Land Transportation 
Office reserved unto themselves the most important functions of 
traffic management. It is a self-evident fact that the efforts of the 
strategists and of the tactician are of no avail even though with 
the utmost brilliance they bring their forces to bear at the critical 
point and at the crucial time if those forces are without reserves 
and without supplies. The military commander must have as­
surance that his reserves of personnel and his requirements for 
supplies are delivered to him when and where he wants them, as 
well as in the quantities that he requires. It is transportation 
which gives time-place utility to material and per�onnel. !tis time-­
place utility that the commander requires. He must be complete­
ly sure, therefore, of his transportation and in order to be com;. 
pletely sure his transportation must be a component of his com­
mand subject to his will. 
During the recent war the Army established a Transporta­
tion Corps. It was the mission of this Corps both to operate carrier 
services on land and sea and to act as traffic manager for the ma­
terial and personnel of the Army when in transit. The people who 
constitute this Corps are exceptionally able in their field. The job 
they did during the war was outstanding, but having moved abroad, 
returned to the United States and then moved elsewhere abroad fab­
ulous quantities of material and tremendous numbers of persons, 
these people made the mistake of believing that they were operating 
a distribution system, particularly with respect to supplies, and 
since the war ended they have spent a great deal of time developing 
what they call the "factory-to-soldier program." They are excellent. 
traffic managers and I have pointed out that traffic management 
requires skilled technicians in a highly complex field, but they have 
overlooked the fact that the control of the distribution of material 
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requires just as highly trained technicians in a field quite as com­
plex and possibly more extensive. Careful analysis will show that 
traffic management is a tool of supply just as carrier operations are 
a tool of traffic management. 
In summation I wish to stress the following points: 
(1) Transportation is a large part of logistics, and logistics,
according to Field Marshal Montgomery, is 85% of modern war. 
(2) Transportation is a function of command.
(3) Transportation is a chain, and in times of maximum use its
links should be of equal strength. 
(4) The traffic manager must be a highly trained and skillful
technician for traffic management is very complex indeed. 
(5) Effectiveness being the all important criterion of a military
machine, consolidations predicated upon economy without effective­
ness are fatal. 
(6) The shipper should be able to exact from the carrier the
service he requires and the services of the carrier should be 
predicated upon the needs of the shipper and not upon the con­
venience of the carrier. 
(7) In modern traffic management air lift should be neither
over-emphasized nor ignored. It is an infant whose growth should 
be watched and stimulated. 
(8) Transportation is a tool of supply, not the director of
supply. 
(9) Finally, I offer the point that the logistician must have a
real appreciation of traffic management, but he should not attempt 
to be a traffic manager. The man who defends himself in court has 
a fool for a client, and the logistician who does his own traffic 
management is no logistician. 
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